At a meeting in a railway car in Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne on 19 April 1917, a provisional agreement was reached between British and French Prime Ministers David Lloyd George and Alexandre Ribot, as well as Italian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Paolo Boselli and Sidney Sonnino, to settle the Italian interest in the Ottoman Empire, in particular Article 9 of the Treaty of London.  The agreement was necessary by the Allies to secure the position of the Italian armed forces in the Middle East. It will be necessary to prevent regional actors from trying to narrow the outlines of a proposal in order to place the external powers against each other and leave the region in chaos. It is therefore essential that the United States, Russia and the EU at least reach a comprehensive understanding and/or agreement. Only then will important regional states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran and Turkey be introduced. In the third phase, some local players are invited to give their consent. The aim was to compensate for the loss of military power in the Middle Eastern Theatre of the First World War, when Russian (tsarist) troops withdrew from the Caucasus campaign, although they were replaced by troops from the First Republic of Armenia.  It was clear to the Italians that the territory allocated to them might not be easily abandoned by the Turkish Empire, so the British Prime Minister proposed a vague formula for post-war adjustment if the actual post-war allocation did not appear to be balanced.  In the Middle East, few men are pilloried these days, as much as Sir Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot.
Sykes, a British diplomat, travelled on the same lawn as T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia), served in the Buren War, inherited a Baronetcy and won a Conservative seat in Parliament. He died young, at the age of 39, during the flu epidemic of 1919. Picot was a French lawyer and diplomat who led a long but opaque life until his death in 1950, mainly in Backwater-Posten. But the two men continue to live in the secret agreement they were to devise during the First World War to divide the vast land mass of the Ottoman Empire into British and French spheres of influence. The Sykes-Picot agreement launched a nine-year process – and other agreements, declarations and treaties – that created the modern States of the Middle East out of the Ottoman carcass. The new frontiers looked little like the original sykes-picot map, but its map is still considered to be the cause of many things that have happened since.
In May, Clayton Balfour stated that in response to the indication that the agreement had been shaken, “It allowed for a significant revision to be necessary in light of the changes that have taken place in the situation since the development of the agreement,” but that he nevertheless felt that “the agreement applies anyway.” Exactly one hundred years ago, two diplomats, a British and a Frenchman, concluded the Sykes-Picot agreement, which divided the Middle East into two zones of influence. The agreement has become one of the cornerstones of the region and has given the heart of the Middle East the shape it has taken since the end of the First World War. However, the political order established a century ago by the British and French superpowers of the time, including the regimes created and the boundaries demarcated, is currently facing a serious challenge. The article examines the agreement through the lenses of the past and present and examines its prospects for survival from the political storms that are currently engulfing the region. He concludes with a recommendation: Israel should be prepared to formulate its ideas for finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If a new “Sykes-Picot” mission is created, it will almost certainly relate to this. The Arab states thus created – Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon – were part of a much larger system of Arab states, most of which had nothing to do with the Sykes Picot agreement.